Abstract-Protocols such as the Explicit Control Protocol environment that can easily be exploited by a small number (XCP) use explicit router feedback to guide endpoint transmission of misbehaving hosts. Endpoint peers can ignore or overrates for near-optimal capacity utilization and fairness. However, write router feedback values for two possible goals. In the non-cooperative end hosts can manipulate and ignore feedback to either obtain unfair advantages over cooperative hosts, or common scenario, one or both endpoints can manipulate perform denial-of-service attacks on intervening network links. network feedback to boost their own share of the network In this paper we explore the methodology behind, and construct bandwidth. In addition, a connection receiver can mislead working examples of different attack vectors on XCP, including data senders to generate a denial-of-service attack on other both cheating senders and receivers. Through detailed simu-hosts or routers on the end-to-end path. Given the ubiquitous lations in ns, we show that misbehaving users can dominate bandwidth allocation on shared links, and our strategies allow high-bandwidth demands of peer-to-peer content distribution them to successfully allocate bandwidth by either sharing or programs, togetherwiththeprevalence of InternetDoS attacks, selfishly competing for the bottleneck bandwidth capacity.
I. INTRODUCTION DoS attacks.
A number of recent projects proposed effective transmisIn this paper, we seek a better understanding of different sion control protocols to manage wide-area network conges-classes of attacks against the XCP protocol. We explore the tion. Both simulations and measurements have confirmed the methodology behind, and construct working examples of difeffectiveness of protocols that leverage explicit congestion ferent attack vectors on XCP, including both cheating senders feedback from routers, including ECN and Explicit Control and receivers. We explore aggressive bandwidth stealing atProtocol (XCP) [1] . For example, XCP decouples fairness and tacks that allow cheating attackers to quickly usurp available efficiency control, resulting in asymptotic optimal bandwidth bandwidth from well-behaved XCP peers, and how cheaters utilization and responsive adaptation to network congestion.
can "cooperate" or compete amongst themselves for bandwidth XCP packets include a congestion control header that in-while minimizing network congestion from their aggressive cludes the sender's current throughput, round trip time (RTT) tactics. Through simulations using ns-2, we show that a single estimate, and a reverse feedback value from the network misbehaving user can dominate bandwidth allocation in a large intended for the packet's recipient. While in transit, XCP-group of flows. Additionally, our strategies allow attackers to enabled routers can modify the throughput value in the successfully allocate bandwidth by either sharing or selfishly congestion header to reflect their desire for the sender to competing for the bottleneck bandwidth capacity. increase or decrease its congestion window size due to locally
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We observed network conditions. On receipt of a packet, the describe related work in Section II, followed by Section III, destination host uses the reverse feedback value to update its where we describe our strategies for exploiting XCP through own congestion window, then copies the modified throughout non-cooperation. In Section IV, we evaluate our strategies value into the reverse feedback field of the next packet to be through both simulation. Finally, we discuss implications of sent. Feedback for each host is built up as they send packets, our results and conclude in Section V. and the recipient forwards network feedback back to the sender during acknowledgment through the reverse feedback header II. RELATED WORK field. This feedback system enables routers to control exactly how much data flows through them while storing no per-flow
The designers of XCP were aware of the possibility of state. Routers can prevent congestion by instructing hosts to malicious XCP hosts. Section 7 of the XCP draft [2] proposes reduce their windows and can keep utilization high in the using monitoring techniques in edge routers to police the event of unused bandwidth by instructing hosts to increase network and provide security. Routers locate unresponsive their windows. Fairness is imposed by the same mechanism; nodes by monitoring their compliance with specific feedback any host which reports an anomalous throughput value will be messages. Hosts which fail to respond could then be throttled told to equalize their window size with all other hosts that are or denied access as seen fit. Since this technique also relies on sharing the same link. throughput and round trip time estimates reported by clients While XCP works exceptionally well when all peers follow to gauge responsiveness to feedback, it is also vulnerable to the recommendations of network feedback [1] , it creates an misinformation from clients.
There are a number of TCP-based attacks that are related to
In this section, we describe design considerations for attack our work, the most pertinent of which are receiver-side, ACK-strategies on XCP, and use them to construct both sender and spoofing vulnerabilities, first uncovered in [3] . By sending receiver-based attacks. We describe the attacks in detail, and flurries of spurious ACK packets, or optimistically ACKing further evaluate them via ns-2 in Section IV. unreceived data, a TCP receiver can cause the sender to inflate their congestion window prematurely, thus speeding up the transfer of data [3] . This attack works because the The singular goal of a cheating XCP host is to secure as receiver is the purveyor of the feedback (the ACK packets) much bandwidth for itself as is possible. There are two reasons which dictate the growth of the sender's congestion window. to do this: Protection from misbehaving receivers can be implemented . To speed up data transfers through a cumulative nonce, where the receiver must prove . To cause a denial of service attack in-order reception of previous packets by providing the sender In order to assume control of bandwidth the malicious with a cumulative XOR value of random numbers embedded host must increase the size of its congestion window so that inside data segments (nonces). [4] explores the potential it is sending as much data as possible. This can also be consequences of widespread TCP receiver misbehavior.
done by proxy, i.e. by deceiving a sender into performing Endpoint misbehavior attacks are also relevant to other the same increase of their congestion window at the receiver congestion control protocols. The attack vectors we discuss side attacker's behest. An example of this type of attack is are relevant to all protocols that rely on user cooperation, in-Optimistic ACKing [3] . cluding traditional Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) [5] , A single, cheating XCP host is able to flood as much [6] and XCP variants such as VCP [7] . Others have begun data onto the network as there is bandwidth at the most to address similar issues in related protocols by proposing constrained link on its end-to-end path. This is possible due to tampering resistant variants such as Robust TCP-Friendly XCP's feedback mechanisms: as the cheater assumes control Congestion Control (RTFRC) [8] .
of more and more bandwidth all other well behaved flows A considerable amount of work has focused on different will be instructed to back-off their send rates lest they cause aspects of the XCP protocol. Low et al. present a fluid dynamic congestion. Thus, XCP enabled networks present an ideal model of representing abstract XCP traffic patterns [9] , while place to cheat since well behaved hosts are guaranteed to others have analyzed XCP's properties in the presence of relinquish bandwidth gracefully. capacity estimation errors [10] . Zhang [12] , while others present a taxonomy of denial of without inciting congestion. Unfortunately, a known limitation service attacks and countermeasures [13] .
of capacity estimation methods is that they are unable to provide accurate appraisals on links that are heavily loaded III. DESIGN OF ATTACKING HOSTS by unresponsive flows, which are the exact conditions that A number of protocols rely on router feedback to guide con-occur when another attacker is present on the network path. gestion control, including Explicit Control Protocol (XCP) [1] , A second approach is to simply copy TCP's congestion Variable-structure congestion Control Protocol (VCP) [7] , and control algorithm. Although this algorithm does incur some Explicit Congestion Notification proposals [6] . While these overhead in the form of dropped packets, it is obviously still protocols avoid reliance on dropped packets as congestion quite effective at allowing a host to ramp up window size in feedback, they all rely on the compliance of endhosts to adjust a controlled manner. If all attackers on a given network link their send rates to alleviate congestion. Unfortunately, in the implement this algorithm then the system approximates the presence of malicious users, the fast convergence of XCP conditions on a normal, TCP dominated network link: each atworks to the disadvantage of normal users by quickly dropping tacker repeatedly competes for bandwidth and backs off when their send rates. congestion is detected. Our simulation results demonstrate that there has been a loss due to congestion. At this point the congestion window size is reset to 1, which is standard TCP procedure when a retransmission timer expires. The congestion attackers using this algorithm are effective at starving the window size remains as 1 for one RTT, which has the effect bandwidth of any normal XCP flows sharing the bottleneck of allowing any overflowing network queues to recover. After link.
this time period the congestion window size is set to 50%
There is still a lingering problem with emulating TCP con-of its value prior to backoff, in accordance to standard TCP gestion control in the context of malicious XCP clients. Using multiplicative decrease procedures. It is worth noting that a this method assumes that all attackers are still responsive to short timer which is triggered on packet retransmission is used congestion, even if they are unresponsive to XCP feedback. to prevent several sequential retransmissions from triggering However, making any assumptions about the complacent be-multiple 50% backoffs. havior of an attacker is a fallacy. If any attacker on a link is In our testing we evaluate two different types of abusing totally unresponsive then no amount of probing by any means hosts: one that continuously probes and one that locks its will be able to secure additional bandwidth for an emergent congestion window size after the initial probing. In the former cheater. Conversely, additional probing simply causes packet build, the attacker resumes using the additive increase equation drops and lower overall throughput for the congestion con-to probe for bandwidth after the congestion window has been trolled attacker. Other than resorting to a network flooding reset to 50% due to a packet loss. In the latter build, the war of attrition against the unresponsive flow in an attempt to attacker does not resume additive increase; instead it simply force a response from it, a congestion controlled attacker can locks the size of its congestion window at 50% and ignores not win against a fully unresponsive one.
all feedback. While a locked attacker is in this state, it This realization leads to the development of a third attacking passively monitors the average RTT of its packets in order model: the malicious host probes for bandwidth once, then to guage whether additional network resources are available. assumes control of whatever it can find and ignores network If a locked attacker observes a reduction in RTT by at least conditions until it is done transferring data. This final approach 25% over a period of less than a second it will unlock its allocates bandwidth on a first-come-first-serve basis, where congestion window and resume probing using the additive the attacker who is first to probe across a bottleneck link is increase equation. sure to take control of the majority of the bandwidth present; This method of passively monitoring for additional bandall subsequent attackers will be forced to split the remaining width works since we assume that each attacker is utilizing a bandwidth. The one instance where this method of attack is network link who's bandwidth is constrained by one of two sub-optimal is when an attacking flow in control of a large things: portion of the available bandwidth stops sending. When this * Maximum network bottleneck bandwidth happens, if there are other attackers present on the link, it is in their best interest to take control of the resources which were just freed, but since they are not actively probing they
In the first case, constraint by physical network characterismay not be capable of doing this. This issue can be resolved tics means that the attacker is the first and only cheater present. through passive monitoring: attackers which notice a sudden In both cases all available bandwidth will be used, either by the decrease in RTT values or surge in positive XCP feedback can attacker in question or by a combination of attackers. Although surmise that new resources have become available and re-enter an individual attacker can not determine which of the these the initial bandwidth probing phase. two conditions it is currently operating under we know that all bandwidth will be used, therefore a dramatic reduction in RTT B. Sender-side Attacks: the Abusing Host can only be indicative of the freeing of network resources. In
With the aforementioned principals in mind we construct an this case it is essential to begin probing again so the resources abusing XCP client which (mostly) ignores XCP feedback and can be appropriated. attempts to cheat by sending as much data as possible. The underlying methodology for our implementation is the standard C. Receiver-side Attacks. the Lying Host TCP congestion control scheme. The attacker always applies
The previous section describes the construction of an abupositive XCP feedback if it is received, which effectively sive XCP client which ignores feedback in order to send data Comparing these two sets of simulation results reinforces our initial assumption that attackers with locking behavior attack. Note that in Figure 4 the attacker fails to achieve the would demonstrate superior performance when compared to consistently perfect utilization of the network that a normal constantly probing abusers. The latter implementation incurs single XCP flow would achieve only during the initial probe severe packet drops, which is antithetical to the benefits of period. After that the congestion window size is locked, which using XCP in the first place. In contrast, the window locking halts probing behavior, and positive XCP feedback informs abusive attackers never drop more than two packets per flow. the attacker of the optimal congestion window size to assume.
One anomaly worth discussing is the fact that network Figure 5 demonstrates the effectiveness of a cheater with 4, 14, utilization climbs above 100%. This is due to the fact that and 49 normal XCP hosts on the network, with the changes utilization is measured as total outgoing bandwidth. At points in density occurring every 30 seconds. At no point does the above 100%, the router queues are being filled up. This event cheating host fall below the bandwidth that would be assigned is always followed by one or more packet drops, which is fairly. Network utilization is consistently high, while packet followed by one or more flows backing off. drops for the attacker are almost non-existent at 2 for the Figure 9 demonstrates the effect of staggering the entrance duration of the simulation. we agree with the recommendation for monitors, we discuss A. Attacker Evaluation the monitoring requirements for detecting both abuser-and
The simulation results of our attackers exemplify their suc-lying-attackers and requirements for both local and remote cess at accomplishing the stated goal of their design: to control detection. The rationale for remote detection is simple: we as much available bandwidth as possible and stifle legitimate assume that it is possible for an attacker to use a compromised XCP flows. Normal, responsive XCP traffic's compliance with or unmonitored access point to the network. feedback makes it an ideal target for exploitation since flows Remote and local detection of an abusive attacker has the will gracefully scale back when faced with an unresponsive same requirements. The receiver, presumably a non-cheater, attacker. This enables malicious hosts to dominate network copies delta throughput into reverse feedback. The reverse resources no matter how many other flows are present while feedback value is untouched by the network. The monitor incurring almost no penalties in the form of dropped packets (again, remote or local), must track the bandwidth of the flow or untenable latencies.
and ensure that the reverse feedback values are being heeded. Since attacking the XCP protocol yields such high returns, The remote monitor has a more difficult job, as an estimated there is significant incentive for the behavior to take place. half of an RTT will pass before a value is acted on. It is Given that attackers can completely sap available network insufficient to merely record the reverse feedback being sent resources this inevitably leads to a situation where the only to a host for comparison against the cwnd value it will report in effective way to aquire bandwidth at all is to attack as well. the XCP header of its next packet, since it would be trivial for This creates a negative feedback cycle which reinforces bad an abusive attacker to augment their abilities to lie about their behavior as the only tenable form of action. Whether attackers actual values as well. The only solution is rate monitoring, work in concert together or not, i.e. their varying responses which unfortunately necessitates stateful overhead in all XCP to congestion feedback, they still exhibit low overhead, high enabled leaf routers. overall utilization, and total effectiveness at starving normal Local detection of a lying attacker is easy. Since there are XCP flows. Our results show that even in the presence of no XCP routers in between the monitor and the attacker, the window locking, fully unresponsive attacking flows, the other incoming delta throughput must match the outgoing reverse attackers still manage to gain more bandwidth than any normal feedback. If not, the monitored host is an attacker. Local flows which are present. Strikingly, as noted above, in this monitoring is not a sufficient countermeasure against lying situation the majority of attackers end up securing about as attackers: the bandwidth and denial-of-service effects impact much bandwidth as they would have in the case that there were the sender, who also typically incurs any bandwidth costs. no attackers at all and each host responded to XCP feedback Because the impacts are on the side of the sender, best appropriately. This simply reinforces the point that ironically, practices dictate that monitoring and detection occur remotely in the presence of even one attacker, the only way to achieve (near the non-cheating sender). Unfortunately, detection is a "fair" portion of network throughput is to attack as well.
difficult for a number of reasons:
What is particularly alarming about our results is the ef-1) XCP routers alter the delta throughput value after it has fectiveness of the lying attacker. Just as with TCP optimistic passed the remote monitor in route to the receiver. ACK attacks, a lying XCP attacker can force a fully standards 2) Packet The only apparent solution to sender side liar detection is for or other data provider by causing their servers to flood their the sender's most immediate leaf router to artificially limit the own outgoing links to the Internet. senders congestion window size and consequently their send rate by putting a known, low value into the delta throughput B. Mitigation Strategies of that senders outgoing packets. Once any router on an There are multiple potential strategies to detect attacking XCP flow's end-to-end path has entered a value into delta XCP hosts. One approach is to place monitors at every throughput that value can only be lowered, since the bottleneck still remain far less than that for typical TCP flows, meaning that the actual negative ramifications of this overhead are negligible. Even when multiple attackers are present on the same network links, overall utilization remains almost as high as if the flows were cooperating normally, adding further incentive for this practice.
